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Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and The Committee to Preserve the Religious Right to Organize. Case 20–CA–139745

May 18, 2016

DECISION AND ORDER

BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND MCFERRAN

On September 8, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Eleanor Laws issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief. The General Counsel and the Charging Party each filed cross exceptions and a supporting brief. The Respondent filed answering briefs, and the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed reply briefs.¹

The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The judge found, applying the Board’s decisions in *D. R. Horton*, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and *Murphy Oil USA, Inc.*, 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf. denied in relevant part, 808 F.3d. 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing an arbitration agreement that requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive their rights to pursue class or collective actions involving employment-related claims in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial. The judge also found that maintaining the arbitration agreement violated Section 8(a)(1) because employees reasonably would believe that it bars or restricts their right to file unfair labor practice charges with the Board.

The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs,² and we affirm the

¹ In addition, pursuant to *Reliant Energy*, 339 NLRB 66 (2003), the Charging Party filed a postbrief letter calling the Board’s attention to recent case authority.

On January 29, 2016, the Charging Party filed a “motion to allow oral argument and suggestion for public notice.” The Respondent’s exceptions also requested oral argument. We deny the Charging Party’s motion, and the Respondent’s request, as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties.

² We find no merit in the Charging Party’s cross-exceptions, which raise substantive arguments that are wholly outside the scope of the General Counsel’s complaint. It is well settled that a charging party cannot enlarge upon or change the General Counsel’s theory of a case. *Kimtruss Corp.*, 305 NLRB 710 (1991). Likewise, we reject the Charging Party’s argument that the judge improperly approved the joint mo-

judge’s rulings, findings and conclusions,³ and adopt the recommended Order as modified and set forth in full below.⁴

tion of the General Counsel and the Respondent for her to resolve the case on a stipulated record. The stipulated record includes sufficient evidence to evaluate the complaint, and the additional evidence that the Charging Party sought to introduce exceeded the scope of the General Counsel’s theory.

³ In adopting the judge’s conclusions that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining and enforcing its Agreement, we do not rely on her findings that: (1) the burden was on the Respondent to show that its Agreement was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); (2) the Respondent failed to show that its Agreement affected commerce within the meaning of the FAA; and (3) the Respondent’s team truckdrivers were exempt from the FAA. We may assume for purposes of this case that the FAA is applicable because, consistent with our decisions in *D. R. Horton* and *Murphy Oil*, supra, “[f]inding a mandatory arbitration agreement unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act, insofar as it precludes employees from bringing joint, class, or collective workplace claims in any forum, does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act or undermine its policies.” *Murphy Oil*, 361 NLRB 72, slip op. at 6, citing *D. R. Horton*, supra, 357 NLRB at 2283–2288.

To the extent the Respondent argues that plaintiffs Fardig and Ortiz were not engaged in concerted activity in filing their class action wage and hour lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Central District of California and the Eastern District of California, respectively, we reject that argument. As the Board made clear in *Beyoglu*, 362 NLRB No. 152 (2015), “the filing of an employment-related class or collective action by an individual is an attempt to initiate, to induce, or to prepare for group action and is therefore conduct protected by Section 7.” *Id.*, slip op. at 2. See also *D. R. Horton*, supra, 357 NLRB at 2279.

Our dissenting colleague, relying on his dissenting position in *Murphy Oil*, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2015), would find that the Respondent’s arbitration Agreement does not violate Sec. 8(a)(1). He observes that the Act does not “dictate” any particular procedures for the litigation of non-NLRA claims, and “creates no substantive right for employees to insist on class-type treatment” of such claims. This is all surely correct, as the Board has previously explained in *Murphy Oil*, above, slip op. at 2, and *Bristol Farms*, 363 NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 2 & fn. 2 (2015). But what our colleague ignores is that the Act “does create a right to pursue joint, class, or collective claims if and as available, without the interference of an employer-imposed restraint.” *Murphy Oil*, above, slip op. at 2 (emphasis in original). The Respondent’s Agreement is just such an unlawful restraint.

Likewise, for the reasons explained in *Murphy Oil* and *Bristol Farms*, there is no merit to our colleague’s view that finding the Agreement unlawful runs afoul of employees’ Sec. 7 right to “refrain from” engaging in protected concerted activity. See *Murphy Oil*, above, slip op. at 18; *Bristol Farms*, above, slip op. at 3. Nor is he correct in insisting that Sec. 9(a) of the Act requires the Board to permit individual employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 right to engage in concerted legal activity. See *Murphy Oil*, above, slip op. at 17–18; *Bristol Farms*, above, slip op. at 2.

We also reject the position of our dissenting colleague that the Respondent’s motions to compel arbitration were protected by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. In *Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB*, 461 U.S. at 747, the Court identified two situations in which a lawsuit enjoys no such protection: where the action is beyond a State court’s jurisdiction because of federal preemption, and where “a suit . . . has an objective that is illegal under federal law.” 461 U.S. at 737 fn. 5. Thus, the Board may properly restrain litigation efforts that have the illegal

AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Substitute the following for Conclusion of Law 3: “3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when it enforced the MAA by asserting the MAA in litigation that Plaintiffs Fardig and Ortiz brought against the Respondent.”

ORDER

The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with a place of business in Sacramento, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from

(a) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts the right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

(b) Maintaining and/or enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement that requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

objective of limiting employees’ Sec. 7 rights and enforcing an unlawful contractual provision (such as the Respondent’s motions to compel arbitration in the underlying wage and hour lawsuits here), even if the litigation was otherwise meritorious or reasonable. See *Murphy Oil*, supra, slip op. at 20–21; *Convergys Corp.*, 363 NLRB No. 51, slip op. at 2 fn. 5 (2015).

Finally, we disagree with our dissenting colleague’s conclusion that the Respondent’s Agreement does not unlawfully interfere with employees’ right to file unfair labor practice charges with the Board. We note that our colleague repeats an argument previously made, that an individual arbitration agreement lawfully may require the arbitration of unfair labor practice claims if the agreement reserves to employees the right to file charges with the Board. As explained in *Ralphs Grocery*, 363 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 3, that argument is at odds with well-established Board law.

⁴ We reject the Charging Party’s request that we impose additional remedies on the Respondent, as the Charging Party has not shown that the remedies set forth in *D. R. Horton* and *Murphy Oil* are insufficient to remedy the Respondent’s violations.

We have amended the judge’s conclusions of law to reflect that fact that Plaintiffs Fardig and Ortiz, and not the Charging Party, filed the lawsuits against the Respondent; and we have corrected the Order to reflect the appropriate regional office and to conform to the Board’s standard remedial language. Because the courts granted the Respondent’s motions to compel individual arbitration and the lawsuits are no longer pending, we find it unnecessary to order the Respondent, as in *Murphy Oil* (slip op. at 21–22), to remedy the Sec. 8(a)(1) enforcement violation by notifying the court that it no longer opposes the lawsuits filed by Plaintiffs Fardig and Ortiz. We have also substituted the attached notices for those of the administrative law judge.

(a) Rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear to employees that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of their right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict employees’ right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

(b) Notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement in any form that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised agreement.

(c) In the manner set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s decision, reimburse Maribel Ortiz and any other plaintiffs in *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD (E.D. Cal.) and Jeremy Fardig and any other plaintiffs in *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVSAN (C.D. Cal.) for reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses that they may have incurred in opposing the Respondent’s motions to dismiss the collective lawsuits and compel individual arbitration.

(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all facilities in California the attached notice marked “Appendix A,” and at all other facilities employing covered employees, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”⁵ Copies of the notices, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 28, 2014, and any former employees against whom the Respondent has enforced its mandatory arbitration agreement since April 28, 2014. If the Re-

⁵ If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notices reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”

spondent has gone out of business or closed any facilities other than the one involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice marked Appendix B” to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at those facilities at any time since April 28, 2014.

(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region 20 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. May 18, 2016

Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman

Lauren McFerran, Member

(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

MEMBER MISCIMARRA, dissenting.

In this case, my colleagues find that the Respondent’s Mutual Arbitration Agreement (Agreement) violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act or NLRA) because the Agreement waives the right to participate in class or collective actions regarding non-NLRA employment claims. Maribel Ortiz, Jeremy Fardig, and other employees each signed the Agreement. Later, Ortiz filed a lawsuit against the Respondent in federal court asserting class and representative claims for violations of federal and state wage and hour laws. In reliance on the Agreement, the Respondent filed a motion to compel individual arbitration, which the court granted. Fardig and other employees also filed a class action lawsuit against the Respondent in federal court alleging violations of wage and hour laws. Again relying on the Agreement, the Respondent filed a motion to compel individual arbitration, which the court granted. My colleagues find that the Respondent thereby unlawfully enforced its Agreement. I respectfully dissent from these findings for the reasons explained in my partial dissenting opinion in *Murphy Oil USA, Inc.*¹ I also dissent from my colleagues’ finding that the Agreement

¹ 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in *Murphy Oil* invalidating class-action waiver agreements was denied enforcement by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. *Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB*, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).

interferes with the right of employees to file charges with the Board.

1. *The “Class Action” Waiver.* I agree that an employee may engage in “concerted” activities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to a claim asserted under a statute other than NLRA.² However, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest authority in the Board to dictate any particular procedures pertaining to the litigation of non-NLRA claims, nor does the Act render unlawful agreements in which employees waive class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the contrary, as discussed in my partial dissenting opinion in *Murphy Oil*, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “adjust” grievances “at any time.”³ This aspect of Section 9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the collective rights enumerated in Section 7. Thus, I believe it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive right for employees to insist on class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims;⁴ (ii) a class-waiver agreement pertaining to non-NLRA

² I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activities engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA Sec. 7. See *Murphy Oil*, above, slip op. at 23–25 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part). However, the existence or absence of Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an individual employee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective action. *Id.*; see also *Beyoglu*, 362 NLRB No. 152, slip op. at 4–5 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).

³ *Murphy Oil*, above, slip op. at 30–34 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legislative history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual employee’s right to “adjust” any employment-related dispute with his or her employer. See *Murphy Oil*, above, slip op. at 31–32 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part).

⁴ When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are potentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class-type procedures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See *D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB*, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted), petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. 2014); *Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper*, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980) (“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).

claims does not infringe on any NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board's position regarding class-waiver agreements;⁵ and (iii) enforcement of a class-action waiver as part of an arbitration agreement is also warranted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).⁶ Although questions may arise regarding the enforceability of particular agreements that waive class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I believe these questions are exclusively within the province of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has jurisdiction over such claims.

Because I believe the Respondent's Agreement was lawful under the NLRA, I would find it was similarly lawful for the Respondent to file motions in federal court seeking to enforce the Agreement. It is relevant that the federal courts that had jurisdiction over the non-NLRA claims *granted* the Respondent's motions to compel arbitration. That the Respondent's motions were reasonably based is also supported by court decisions that have enforced similar agreements.⁷ As the Fifth Circuit recently observed after rejecting (for the second time) the Board's position regarding the legality of class-waiver agreements: "[I]t is a bit bold for [the Board] to hold that an employer who followed the reasoning of our *D. R. Hor-*

ton decision had no basis in fact or law or an 'illegal objective' in doing so. The Board might want to strike a more respectful balance between its views and those of circuit courts reviewing its orders."⁸ I also believe that any Board finding of a violation based on the Respondent's meritorious federal court motions to compel arbitration would improperly risk infringing on the Respondent's rights under the First Amendment's Petition Clause. See *Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB*, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); *BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB*, 536 U.S. 516 (2002); see also my partial dissent in *Murphy Oil*, above, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 33–35. Finally, for similar reasons, I do not believe the Board can properly require the Respondent to reimburse Ortiz, Fardig, or any other plaintiffs for their attorneys' fees and litigation expenses in the circumstances presented here. *Murphy Oil*, above, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 35.

2. *Interference with NLRB Charge Filing.* I disagree with the judge's finding and my colleagues' conclusion that the Agreement violates Section 8(a)(1) by interfering with NLRB charge filing. The Agreement requires arbitration of all employment-related disputes, including those arising under the NLRA,⁹ but expressly states that employees "are not giving up any substantive rights under federal, state, or municipal law (*including the right to file claims with federal, state, or municipal government agencies*)" (emphasis added). The judge found that although the Agreement does not preclude filing a charge with an administrative agency, the Agreement is unlawful because it requires arbitration of employment-related claims covered by the Act. However, for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in *Rose Group d/b/a Applebee's Restaurant*, 363 NLRB No. 75, slip op. at 3–5 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part), I believe that an agreement may lawfully provide for the arbitration of NLRA claims, and such an agreement does not unlawfully interfere with Board charge filing, at least where the agreement expressly preserves the right to file claims or charges with the Board or, more generally, with administrative agencies. The Agreement preserves this right.

⁵ The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly denied enforcement of Board orders invalidating a mandatory arbitration agreement that waived class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. See, e.g., *Murphy Oil, Inc., USA v. NLRB*, above; *D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB*, above. The overwhelming majority of courts considering the Board's position have likewise rejected it. See *Murphy Oil*, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 34 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part); *id.*, slip op. at 36 fn. 5 (Member Johnson, dissenting) (collecting cases); see also *Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc.*, 96 F. Supp. 3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); *Nanavati v. Adecco USA, Inc.*, 99 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015), motion to certify for interlocutory appeal denied 2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015); *Brown v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc.*, No. 1:12-cv-00062-BLW, 2015 WL 1401604 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2015) (granting reconsideration of prior determination that class waiver in arbitration agreement violated NLRA); but see *Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC*, No. ED CV 14-1766 DMG (DTBx), 2016 WL 316019 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016).

⁶ Because my colleagues do not rely on the judge's findings regarding the FAA's application to the Agreement, I do not address them either. However, I disagree with my colleagues' assertion that, assuming the FAA applies here, finding an arbitration agreement that contains a class-action waiver unlawful under the NLRA does not conflict with the FAA. For the reasons expressed in my *Murphy Oil* partial dissent and those thoroughly explained in former Member Johnson's dissent in *Murphy Oil*, the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms. *Murphy Oil*, above, slip op. at 34 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part); *id.*, slip op. at 49–58 (Member Johnson, dissenting).

⁷ See, e.g., *Murphy Oil, Inc., USA v. NLRB*, above; *Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's*, 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2014); *D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB*, above; *Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP*, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); *Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.*, 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).

⁸ *Murphy Oil, Inc., USA v. NLRB*, 808 F.3d at 1021.

⁹ The Agreement requires that "any dispute, demand, claim, controversy, cause of action or suit . . . that in any way arises out of, involves, or relates to Employee's employment . . . shall be submitted to and settled by final and binding arbitration." The only claims to which the Agreement does not apply are "claims for benefits under unemployment compensation laws or workers' compensation laws."

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 18, 2016

Philip A. Miscimarra, Member

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

APPENDIX A

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

- Form, join, or assist a union
- Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
- Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
- Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agreement that our employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement that requires our employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.

WE WILL rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict your right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL notify all current and former employees who were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms that the arbitration agreement has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, WE WILL provide them a copy of the revised agreement.

WE WILL reimburse Maribel Ortiz, Jeremy Fardig, and any other plaintiffs for reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses that they may have incurred in opposing our motions to dismiss their collective wage claims and compel individual arbitration.

HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC.

The Administrative Law Judge's decision can be found at www.nlr.gov/case/20-CA-139745 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.

APPENDIX B

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
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An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

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HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC.

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Yasmin Macariola, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Frank Birchfield, Esq., and *Christopher C. Murray, Esq.*, for the Respondent.
David Rosenfeld, Esq. for the Charging Party.

DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

ELEANOR LAWS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried based on a joint motion and stipulation of facts I approved on June 29, 2015. The charge in this proceeding was filed by the Committee to Preserve the Religious Right to Organize (the Charging Party) on October 28, 2014, and a copy was served by regular mail on Respondent, on October 29, 2014. The General Counsel issued the original complaint on January 28, 2015, and an amended complaint on April 9, 2015. Hobby Lobby, Inc. (the Respondent or Company) filed timely answers denying all material allegations and setting forth defenses.

On June 2, 2015, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed a joint motion to submit a stipulated record to the Administrative Law Judge (Joint Motion). The Charging Party did not join the Joint Motion. On June 3, I issued an order granting the Charging Party until June 17, to file a response to the Joint Motions, including any objections to it. On June 17, the Charging Party filed objections to the Joint Motion, and the General Counsel and the Respondent, replied to the objections, respectively, on June 23 and 24. I issued an order granting the Joint Motion over the Charging Party's objections on June 29.¹

¹ The June 3, 2015, order is hereby admitted into the record as administrative law judge (ALJ) Exh. 1, the Charging Party's June 17

The following issues are presented:

1. Whether the Respondent's Mandatory Arbitration Agreement (MAA) and related policies maintained by the Respondent, which requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to resolution of employment-related disputes by collective or class action violates Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
2. Whether the MAA maintained by the Respondent would reasonably be read by employees to prohibit them from filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. Whether the Respondent's enforcement of the MAA through its motions to compel arbitration in *Jeremy Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVS-AN, U.S.D.C., Central District of California; and *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD, U.S.D.C., Eastern District Court of California, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Party, I make the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. JURISDICTION

At all material times, the Respondent, an Oklahoma corporation with several stores throughout the State of California, including one in Sacramento, California, has been engaged in business as a retailer specializing in arts, crafts, hobbies, home decor, holiday, and seasonal products. The parties admit, and I find, that at all material times, Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.

II. FACTS

The Respondent, Hobby Lobby, is a national retailer of arts, crafts, hobby supplies, home accents, holiday, and seasonal products. It operates approximately 660 stores in 47 states.

The Respondent employs individuals in various job titles including but not limited to the following: office clericals; security staff; cashiers; stockers; floral designers; picture framers; media buyers; craft designers; graphic & web designers; production artists; video tutorial hosts; leave assistants; production quality and compliance assistants; construction warehouse workers; customer service representatives; industrial engineers; inventory control specialists; maintenance technicians; pack-

response is admitted as ALJ Exh. 2, the General Counsel's June 23 reply is admitted as ALJ Exh. 3, and the Respondent's June 24 reply is admitted as ALJ Exh. 4. The following abbreviations are used for citations in this decision: "Jt. Mot." for the General Counsel and Respondent's joint motion; "Jt. Exh." for the exhibits attached to the joint motion; "GC Br." for the General Counsel's brief; "R Br." for the Respondent's brief; and "CP Br." for the Charging Party's brief. Although I have included several citations to the record to highlight particular exhibits, I emphasize that my findings and conclusions are based not solely on the evidence specifically cited, but rather are based my review and consideration of the entire record.

ers/order pullers; photo editors; truck-trailer technicians; truck-trailer technician trainees; social media writers; sales and use tax accountants; and team truck drivers who transport Respondent's products across state lines. (Jt. Mot. ¶ 4(a) & ¶ 4(b).)

Upon commencing employment, all employees receive a copy of the Respondent's employee handbook. There are two different versions of the employee handbook—one for employees in California and one for employees outside of California. Employees must sign in receipt of the handbook and agree to be bound by its terms. The version applicable to employees in California states²:

By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have received a copy of the Company's California Employee Handbook ("Employee Handbook"). I understand this Employee Handbook contains important information on the Company's policies, procedures, and rules. It also contains my obligations as an employee.

I understand that this Employee Handbook replaces and supersedes any and all previous employee handbooks that I may have received, or agreements or promises made by any representative of the Company other than a Corporate Officer prior to the date of my signature below, and that I cannot rely upon any promises or representations made to me by anyone concerning the terms and conditions of my employment that are contrary to or inconsistent with this Employee Handbook, or any subsequent written modifications or revisions to this Employee Handbook posted on the Company's Employee Information Boards.

I understand that my employment with the Company is conditioned upon the contents of this Employee Handbook. I further understand that, with the exception of the Submission of Disputes to Binding Arbitration section of this Employee Handbook and the Mutual Arbitration Agreement, the Company may alter, change, amend, rescind, or add to any policies, procedures, or rules set forth in this Employee Handbook from time to time with or without prior notice. I further understand that the Company will notify me of any material changes to this Employee Handbook, and that, by continuing employment after being so notified of such changes, I acknowledge, accept, and agree to such changes as a condition of my employment and continued employment.

I understand that the employment relationship between me and the Company is at-will. I am employed on an at-will basis, as are all Company employees, and nothing to the contrary stated anywhere in this Employee Handbook or by any Company representative changes my or any employee's at-will status. I am free to resign at any time, for any reason, with or without notice. Similarly, the Company is free to terminate my employment at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all. I also understand that nothing in this Employee Handbook is to be construed as creating, whether by implication or otherwise, any legal or contractual obligations or restrictions

upon the Company's ability to terminate me as an employee at-will, for any reason at any time. Further, no person, other than a Corporate Officer of the Company, may enter into any written agreement amending this at-will employment policy or otherwise alter the at-will employment status of any employee.

By my signature below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand the provisions of this Employee Handbook and agree to abide by all Company policies, procedures, practices, and rules.

Since at least April 28, 2014, the Respondent has maintained the MAA in its employee handbook. The MAA requires employees to waive resolution of employment-related disputes by class, representative or collective action or other otherwise jointly with any other person. Since at least April 28, 2014, the Respondent has required all of its employees to enter into the MAA in order to obtain and maintain employment with the Respondent. (Jt. Mot. ¶ 4(e) & ¶ 4(i).)

The MAA provides, in relevant part:

This Mutual Arbitration Agreement ("Agreement"), by and between the undersigned employee ("Employee") and the Company, is made in consideration for the continued at-will employment of Employee, the benefits and compensation provided by Company to Employee, and Employee's and Company's mutual agreement to arbitrate as provided in this Agreement. Employee and Company hereby agree that any dispute, demand, claim, controversy, cause of action, or suit (collectively referred to as "Dispute") that Employee may have, at any time following the acceptance and execution of this Agreement, with or against Company, its affiliates, subsidiaries, officers, directors, agents, attorneys, representatives, and/or other employees, that in any way arises out of, involves, or relates to Employee's employment with Company or the separation of Employee's employment with Company (including without limitation, all Disputes involving wrongful termination, wages, compensation, work hours, . . . sexual harassment, harassment and/or discrimination based on any class protected by federal, state or municipal law, and all Disputes involving interference and/or retaliation relating to workers' compensation, family or medical leave, health and safety, harassment, discrimination, and/or the opposition of harassment or discrimination, and/or any other employment-related Dispute in tort or contract), shall be submitted to and settled by final and binding arbitration in the county and state in which Employee is or was employed. Such arbitration shall be conducted pursuant to the American Arbitration Association's National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes or the Institute for Christian Conciliation's Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation, then in effect, before an arbitrator licensed to practice law in the state in which Employee is or was employed and who is experienced with employment law. . . . The parties agree that all Disputes contemplated in this Agreement shall be arbitrated with Employee and Company as the only parties to the arbitration, and that no Dispute contemplated in this Agreement shall be arbitrated, or litigated in a court of law, as part of a class action, collective action, or otherwise jointly with any third party. Prior to sub-

² The acknowledgment of the handbook does not materially differ for employees outside of California for purposes of this decision.

mitting a Dispute to arbitration, the aggrieved party shall first attempt to resolve the Dispute by notifying the other party in writing of the Dispute. If the other party does not respond to and resolve the Dispute within 10 days of receipt of the written notification, the aggrieved party then may proceed to arbitration. The parties agree that the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding. Judgment on any award rendered by an arbitrator may be entered and enforced in any court having jurisdiction thereof.

This Agreement between Employee and Company to arbitrate all employment-related Disputes includes, but is not limited to, all Disputes under or involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1991, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Fair Credit Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and all other federal, state, and municipal statutes, regulations, codes, ordinances, common laws, or public policies that regulate, govern, cover, or relate to equal employment, wrongful termination, wages, compensation, work hours, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, defamation, negligence, personal injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, breach of fiduciary duty, sexual harassment, harassment and/or discrimination based on any class protected by federal, state or municipal law, or interference and/or retaliation involving workers' compensation, family or medical leave, health and safety, harassment, discrimination, or the opposition of harassment or discrimination, and any other employment-related Dispute in tort or contract. This Agreement shall not apply to claims for benefits under unemployment compensation laws or workers' compensation laws.

By agreeing to arbitrate all Disputes, Employee and Company understand that they are not giving up any substantive rights under federal, state, or municipal law (including the right to file claims with federal, state; or municipal government agencies). Rather, Employee and Company are mutually agreeing to submit all Disputes contemplated in this Agreement to arbitration, rather than to a court. Company shall bear the administrative costs and fees assessed by the arbitration provider selected by Employee: either the American Arbitration Association or the Institute for Christian Conciliation. Company shall be solely responsible for paying the arbitrator's fee. Except for those Disputes involving statutory rights under which the applicable statute may provide for an award of costs and attorney's fees, each party to the arbitration shall be solely responsible for its own costs and attorney's fees, if any, relating to any Dispute and/or arbitration. Should any party institute any action in a court of law or equity against the other party with respect to any Dispute required to be arbitrated under this Agreement, the responding party shall be entitled to recover from the initiating party all costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred to enforce this Agreement and compel arbitration, and all other damages resulting from or incurred as a result of such court action.

Every individual who works for Company must have signed and returned to his/her supervisor this Agreement to be eligible for employment and continued employment with Company. Further, Employee's employment or continued employment will evidence Employee's acceptance of this Agreement. Employee acknowledges and agrees that Company is engaged in transactions involving interstate commerce, that this Agreement evidences a transaction involving commerce, and that this Agreement is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. If any specific provision of this Agreement is invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement shall remain binding and enforceable. This Agreement constitutes the entire mutual agreement to arbitrate between Employee and Company and supersedes any and all prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements or understandings regarding the arbitration of employment-related Disputes. This Agreement is not, and shall not be construed to create, a contract of employment, express or implied, and shall not alter Employee's at-will employment status.

Employee and Company acknowledge that they have read this Mutual Arbitration Agreement, are giving up any right they might have at any point to sue each other, are waiving any right to a jury trial, and are knowingly and voluntarily consenting to all terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement.

(Jt. Exhs. I, J.) The MAA is also part of the application for employment with the Respondent. (Jt. Exhs. K, L.) It has its own signature requirement. The signed MAA is included in each new employee's "new employee packet" and is filed in the employee's personnel file. (Jt. Exhs. M–X.) During the period of December 18, 2010 to December 18, 2014, Respondent hired approximately 65,880 employees and re-hired approximately 6,324 employees for a total of approximately 72,204 recipients of the MAA. (Jt. Mot. ¶ 4(h).)

On December 3, 2013, the Respondent filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California to dismiss individual and representative wage-related claims a former employee had filed against it under California law, in *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD (E.D. Cal.). (Jt. Exh. Y; Jt. Mot. ¶ 5.) The Respondent moved, in the alternative, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), to compel individual arbitration of plaintiff's claims under the MAA the plaintiff had signed when she began her employment. (Jt. Exh. Y.)

On April 17, 2014, the Respondent filed a motion seeking to dismiss a putative class action lawsuit filed by multiple employees alleging wage and hour claims against it under California law in *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVSAN (C.D. Cal.). (Jt. Exh. Z; Jt. Mot. ¶ 5.) In the alternative, pursuant to FAA, the Respondent moved to compel individual arbitration under the MAAs signed by each named plaintiff. (Joint Ex. 22.) On June 13, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted the Respondent's motion to compel individual arbitration under the MAA. *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.*, 2014 WL 2810025 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2014). The *Fardig* court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the MAA was unenforceable under California

law and under the National Labor Relations Act pursuant to the Board's decision in *D. R. Horton, Inc.*, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. granted in part and denied in part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).

On October 1, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in the *Ortiz* case granted the Respondent's motion to compel individual arbitration under the MAA. *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 52 F.Supp. 3d 1070 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The court considered the Board's decision in *D. R. Horton*, and concluded its reasoning conflicted with the FAA and the Supreme Court's decision in *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).

III. DECISION AND ANALYSIS

A. The MAA's Prohibition on Class and Collective Legal Claims

Complaint paragraphs 4(a), (c), (d), and 5 allege that, at all material times since at least April 28, 2014, the Respondent has maintained the MAA, which requires employees to waive their right to resolution of employment-related disputes by collective or class action, as a condition of employment, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

Under Section 8(a)(1), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The rights guaranteed in Section 7 include the right "to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . ."

1. Application of *D. R. Horton* and *Murphy Oil*

When evaluating whether a rule, including a mandatory arbitration agreement, violates Section 8(a)(1), the Board applies the test set forth in *Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia*, 343 NLRB 646 (2004).³ See *U-Haul Co. of California*, 347 NLRB 375, 377 (2006), enf. 255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007); *D. R. Horton*, supra. Under *Lutheran Heritage*, the first inquiry is whether the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7. If it does, the rule is unlawful. If it does not, "the violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights." *Lutheran Heritage* at 647.

Because the MAA explicitly prohibits employees from pursuing employment-related claims on a class or collective basis, I find it violates Section 8(a)(1). The right to pursue concerted legal action, including class complaints, addressing wages, hours, and working conditions falls within Section 7's protections. See, e.g., *Murphy Oil USA, Inc.*, 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014); *D. R. Horton*, supra;⁴ see also *Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB*,

437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978) (Section 7 protects employee efforts seeking "to improve working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums; *Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co.*, 42 NLRB 942, 948-949 (1942); *Salt River Valley Water Users Assn.*, 99 NLRB 849, 853-854 (1952), enf. 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); *Brady v. National Football League*, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011) ("lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment is 'concerted activity' under §7 of the National Labor Relations Act."); *Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp. v. NLRB*, 567 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1977) (mem. disp.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978). Accordingly, an employer rule or policy that interferes with such actions violates Section 8(a)(1). *D. R. Horton*, supra.; *Murphy Oil*, supra; See also *Chesapeake Energy Corp.*, 362 NLRB No. 80 (2015); *Cellular Sales of Missouri*, 362 NLRB No. 27 (2015); *The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.*, 362 NLRB No. 157 (2015); *Countrywide Financial Corp.*, 362 NLRB No. 165 (2015); *PJ Cheese Inc.*, 362 NLRB No. 177 (2015); *Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc.*, 362 NLRB No. 184 (2015); *On Assignment Staffing Services*, 362 NLRB No. 189 (2015).

The Respondent propounds numerous arguments as to why *D. R. Horton* and its progeny should be overturned.⁵ (R Br. 6-48.) I am, however, required to follow Board precedent, unless and until it is overruled by the United States Supreme Court.⁶ See *Gas Spring Co.*, 296 NLRB 84, 97 (1989) (citing, inter alia, *Insurance Agents International Union*, 119 NLRB 768 (1957), revd. 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd. 361 U.S. 477 (1960)), enf. 908 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1084 (1991). Applying the above-cited Board precedent, I find the MAA violates Section 8(a)(1).

Though the Board has made its ruling on the issue clear, I will address the Respondent's arguments that have not been as fully covered by previous decisions. The Respondent contends that a class action waiver does not abridge employees' right to seek class certification to any greater extent than an employer's filing an opposition to an employee's motion for class certification. Of course it does; the former precludes the right, the latter responds to it. And it is apparent the waiver gives the opposition teeth. The Respondent then adds the element of success to the employer's motion to secure its argument. Success of the employer's motion cannot be presumed, however. The Respondent's argument thus fails.

Deference and the Federal Arbitration Act, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 907 (January 12, 2015), provides a well-reasoned explanation as to why the Board's conclusion that collective and class litigation is protected Section 7 activity should be accorded deference by the courts.

⁵ Many of these arguments are in line with the dissents in *D. R. Horton* and *Murphy Oil*. Numerous Board and ALJ decisions have addressed the specific arguments raised by the Respondent and there is nothing I can add in this decision that has not already been addressed repeatedly.

⁶ The Respondent contends that, because the Board did not petition for a writ of certiorari to challenge the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the relevant part of *D. R. Horton*, and because that decision rests primarily on interpretation of a statute other than the NLRA, I should not be constrained by Board precedent. No authority was cited for this contention, however, and I therefore decline to stray from the Board's established caselaw on this point.

³ The Charging Party argues that *Lutheran Heritage* should be overruled. Any arguments regarding the legal integrity of Board precedent, however, are properly addressed to the Board.

⁴ The Board in *Murphy Oil* reexamined *D. R. Horton*, and determined that its reasoning and results were correct.

The Respondent also contends that the Board's decisions stand for the proposition that employees have the right to have certification decisions heard on their merits. The Board has made no such holding or suggestion. If, by way of the example cited in the Respondent's brief, the class representative misses a filing deadline, nothing in any of the Board's cases suggests a court must nonetheless decide class certification on the merits.

As to the Respondent's assertion that there is no basis in the NLRA, the Federal Rules, or case law for *D. R. Horton's* presumption that class procedures were created to serve any concerns or purposes under the NLRA, the Board has not relied on such concerns or purposes. Two employees who together file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) about racial harassment are engaged in concerted activity about their working conditions, though the EEOC's charge processing procedures were certainly not created to serve any concerns or purposes under the NLRA. The EEOC's procedures, like class procedures in court, are one of many avenues available for concerted legal activity, regardless of the purposes those procedures were intended to serve.

The Respondent next appears to be arguing that employees can, albeit in vain, file putative class action lawsuits despite the MAA, suffer no adverse consequences for it, and therefore the MAA does not infringe on their rights. There need not be adverse consequences for non-adherence to the MAA for it to violate the Act. Moreover, the MAA on its face spells out adverse consequences for filing putative class actions. The MAA states, in relevant part:

Should any party institute any action in a court of law or equity against the other party with respect to any Dispute required to be arbitrated under this Agreement, the responding party shall be entitled to recover from the initiating party all costs, expenses, and attorney fees incurred to enforce this Agreement and compel arbitration, and all other damages resulting from or incurred as a result of such court action.

Thus, in addition to breaking an agreement with the employer not to sue as an express condition of continued employment, an employee who files a putative class action may be assessed with fees and damages.

The Respondent also contends that the Board in *D. R. Horton* misinterpreted the *Norris-LaGuardia Act* (NLGA) when determining it prohibits the enforcement of agreements like the FAA. The Board recently reaffirmed its position that the FAA must yield to the NLGA, stating

The Board has previously explained why "even if there were a direct conflict between the NLRA and the FAA, the Norris-LaGuardia Act . . . indicates that the FAA would have to yield insofar as necessary to accommodate Section 7 rights." An arbitration agreement between an individual employee and an employer that completely precludes the employee from engaging in concerted legal activity clearly conflicts with the express federal policy declared in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That conflict in no way depends on whether the agreement is properly characterized as a condition of employment. By its plain terms, the Norris-LaGuardia Act sweepingly condemns "[a]ny undertaking or promise . . . in conflict with the public policy declared" in the statute: insuring that the "individual

unorganized worker" is "free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers . . . in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection," including "[b]y all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor dispute who . . . is prosecuting, any action or suit in any court of the United States or any state."

On Assignment Staffing Services, supra, slip op. at 10 (Emphasis in original, internal citations and footnotes omitted.)

2. The MAA as an employment contract

The Charging Party also asserts that the FAA does not apply because there is no employment contract, citing to the Supreme Court's decisions in *Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Adams*, 532 U.S. 105, 113–114 (2001), *Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna*, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006), and *Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).

⁷ The Charging Party points out that the MAA itself states, "[t]his Agreement is not, and shall not be construed to create, a contract of employment, express or implied, and shall not alter Employee's at-will employment status." The employees' at-will status is also set forth in the introductory paragraph of the employee handbook. (Jt. Exh. I p. 5; Jt. Exh. J p. 5.)

The Charging Party notes that the Respondent has not offered evidence or argument that a contract of employment has been created by virtue of the MAA in any of the states where it operates. Resolution of this issue would involve delving into each state's body of contract law.⁸ Because it is not required to support my conclusion herein that the MAA violates Section 8(a)(1), I decline to undertake this enormous task, the legal aspects of which none of the parties have addressed in their briefs.

⁷ The Charging Party also asserts that MAA, when coupled with the Respondent's confidentiality policy, solicitation policy, loitering policy, email usage policy, computer usage policy, and/or return of company property policy, provide other bases for finding it unlawful. I agree that these policies, when viewed in conjunction with the MAA, act as further barriers to employees discussing their arbitrations under the MAA and/or garnering support from fellow employees. The complaint, however, does not allege that any policy other than the MAA violates the Act, and therefore my conclusions are limited to the MAA. See *Penntech Papers*, 263 NLRB 264, 265 (1982); *Kimtruss Corp.*, 305 NLRB 710, 711 (1991).

The Charging Party sets forth numerous other arguments, including the FAA's impact on other federal and state statutes, the rights of workers to organize under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the effect of the MAA on union representation. I have considered each argument in the Charging Party's brief. Because this case can be decided by applying the Board precedent discussed above, I do not address all of the Charging Party's arguments.

⁸ For example, under Minnesota law, the disclaimer language in the MAA may negate the existence of a contract. See *Kulkay v. Allied Central Stores, Inc.*, 398 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). By contrast, in *Circuit City*, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined the dispute resolution agreement at issue, with disclaimer language almost identical to the agreement at issue here, was an "employment contract." *Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams*, 194 F.3d 1070 (1999); See also *Ashbey v. Archstone Property Management, Inc.*, 2015 WL 2193178 (9th Cir. 2015).

3. The MAAs and commerce

The Charging Party argues that there is no evidence the individual MAAs with the Respondent's employees affect commerce, and asserts that the activity of arbitration does not affect interstate commerce. This raises the fundamental question of what, in fact, is the "transaction involving commerce" the MAA evidences to bring it within the FAA's reach?

The FAA, at 9 USC § 2, applies to a "written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . ." Specifically excluded, however, are "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 USC § 1. The Supreme Court in *Circuit City* interpreted this exclusionary provision, "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," narrowly, and held it applied only to workers actually working in commercial industries similar to seamen and railroad employees. Relying on *Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson*, 513 U.S. 265 (1995),⁹ the Court in *Circuit City* interpreted Section 2's inclusion provision, a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce," broadly, finding it was not limited to transactions similar to maritime transactions.¹⁰ In line with these interpretations, most contracts of employment fall within the FAA's reach, regardless of whether the employees themselves are involved in any traditionally-defined commercial transactions as part of their work.

In *Allied-Bruce Terminix*, supra, the Supreme Court examined the phrase "evidencing a transaction" involving commerce and determined that "the transaction (that the contract 'evidences') must turn out, *in fact* . . . [to] have involved interstate commerce[.]" (emphasis in original). A prior Supreme Court case, *Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America*, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), that like *Circuit City* and *Allied-Bruce Terminix* inter-

preted the words "involving commerce" as broadly as the words "affecting commerce,"¹¹ involved an employment contract between Polygraphic Co., an employer engaged in interstate commerce, and Norman Bernhardt, the superintendent of Polygraphic Co.'s Vermont plant. The employment contract at issue contained a provision that in case of any dispute, the parties would submit the matter to arbitration by the American Arbitration Association.

The Supreme Court found the FAA did not apply because the company did not show that the employee, "while performing his duties under the employment contract was working 'in' commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of our decisions."¹²

¹¹ *Allied-Bruce Terminix*, supra, at 277.

¹² The agreement provided for the employment of Bernhardt as the superintendent of Polygraphic Co.'s lithograph plant in Vermont. Its terms stated:

"Subject to the general supervision and pursuant to the orders, advice and direction of the Employer, Employee shall have charge of and be responsible for the operation of said lithographic plant in North Bennington, shall perform such other duties as are customarily performed by one holding such position in other, same or similar businesses or enterprises as that engaged in by the Employer, and shall also additionally render such other and unrelated services and duties as may be assigned to him from time to time by Employer.

"Employer shall pay Employee and Employee agrees to accept from Employer, in full payment for Employee's services hereunder, compensation at the rate of \$15,000.00 per annum, payable twice a month on the 15th and 1st days of each month during which this agreement shall be in force; the compensation for the period commencing August 1, 1952 through August 15, 1952 shall be payable on August 15, 1952. In addition to the foregoing, Employer agrees that it will reimburse Employee for any and all necessary, customary and usual expenses incurred by him while traveling for and on behalf of the Employer pursuant to Employer's directions.

"It is expressly understood and agreed that Employee shall not be entitled to any additional compensation by reason of any service which he may perform as a member of any managing committee of Employer, or in the event that he shall at any time be elected an officer or director of Employer.

"The parties hereto do agree that any differences, claim or matter in dispute arising between them out of this agreement or connected herewith shall be submitted by them to arbitration by the American Arbitration Association, or its successor and that the determination of said American Arbitration Association or its successors, or of any arbitrators designated by said Association, on such matter shall be final and absolute. The said arbitrator shall be governed by the duly promulgated rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association, or its successor, and the pertinent provisions of the Civil Practice Act of the State of New York relating to arbitrations [section 1448 et seq.]. The decision of the arbitrator may be entered as a judgment in any court of the State of New York or elsewhere.

"The parties hereto do hereby stipulate and agree that it is their intention and covenant that this agreement and performance hereunder and all suits and special proceedings hereunder be construed in accordance with and under and pursuant to the laws of the State of New York and that in any action special proceedings or other proceeding that may be brought arising out of, in connection with or by reason of this agreement, the laws of the State of New York shall be applicable and shall govern to the exclusion of the law of any other forum, without

⁹ The Court in *Allied-Bruce* found that the term "involving" was the same as "affecting" and that the phrase "'affecting commerce' normally signals Congress' intent to exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the full." 513 U.S. at 273-275.

¹⁰ Though I am bound by the majority's decision in *Circuit City*, I find the dissenting opinions, and in particular Justice Souter's explanation of why the Court's "parsimonious construction of § 1 of the . . . FAA . . . is not consistent with its expansive reading of § 2," more sound and compelling. Presumably the result of adherence to precedent, the phrase "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" is not seen as a residual phrase following the specific category of maritime transactions in § 2, but the phrase "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" is seen as a residual phrase following the specific categories of seamen and railroad employees in § 1. This distinction supplied the Court's rationale for applying the maxim *ejusdem generis* to "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" to support its finding that employment contracts are covered by the FAA. "Maritime transactions" is defined in § 1 by way of listing various transactional contracts, such as charter parties, bills of lading, and agreements relating to supplies and vessels. Applying *ejusdem generis*, the expansive definition given to the phrase "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce," fails to give independent meaning to the term "maritime transaction."

Here, the contract at issue is the MAA.¹³ There is no other employment contract implicated in the complaint or the answer.¹⁴ By virtue of the MAA, the employee and employer have transacted an agreement to resolve employment disputes through arbitration. What is analytically more difficult about the MAA and similar agreements, when compared with most contracts, is that the arbitration agreement itself is part of the consideration for the transaction. The agreement here states that the “Mutual Arbitration Agreement . . . is made in consideration for the continued at-will employment of the Employee, the benefits and compensation provided by Company to Employee, and Employee’s and Company’s mutual agreement to arbitrate as provided in this Agreement.”¹⁵ (Jt. Exh. I p. 55; Jt. Exh. J p. 56.) Generally, when a contract is involved, the arbitration agreement is a means to solve a contract dispute, and the terms of the agreement spell out independent consideration. For example, in *Allied-Bruce Terminix*, consideration for the termite bond at issue was money. In *Buckeye Check Cashing*, individuals entered into “various deferred-payment transactions with . . . Buckeye . . . in which they received cash in exchange for a personal check in the amount of the cash plus a finance charge.” 546 U.S. at 440. In *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the arbitration agreement was part of an application to register with the New York Stock Exchange. In none of these cases was the agreement to arbitrate itself consideration in the “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”

The MAA’s terms, including the “consideration” of the individual arbitral process, are not implicated until there is an employment dispute. In other words, an employment dispute is a condition precedent to performance under the MAA. In typical transactions, a dispute is not necessary for the terms of the agreement to be exercised. For example, in *Buckeye*, the check cashing company provided cash to the individuals as consideration for the individuals signing over their checks and paying a fee. These transactions could play out indefinitely without the

arbitration agreement provision ever coming into play. If the individuals in *Buckeye* performed their end of the bargain by turning over their checks and the check cashing company sat idle, a dispute would arise. Conversely, there would be no need for the check cashing company to do anything if the individual never presented it with a check to cash. Not so here, if the employees’ work is part of the consideration. At all times prior to the advent of a covered dispute and the invocation of a way to resolve it, the employer is continuing to employ the employee and the employee is continuing to perform work for the employer. Continued employment triggers no duty on the employer or the employee with regard to the MAA.¹⁶ The employee deciding not to continue employment with the Respondent, without more, likewise triggers no duty under the MAA. It is difficult to see, therefore, how continued employment is part of the “transaction” the MAA evidences.

Simply put, the MAA is a contract about how employment disputes will be resolved. The “transactions” evidenced by the MAA are agreements to arbitrate any and all employment disputes. Yes, the MAA is a condition of employment, but its topic is not the work the employees will perform or the conditions under which they will perform it. An employer engaged in interstate commerce could require employees, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement stating that they will sit with their coworkers for lunchtime on Tuesdays.¹⁷ The topic of this agreement is not the employee’s work duties or the employer’s business, but rather who the employees will eat lunch with on Tuesdays. It certainly would seem a stretch to find that this agreement would be a “maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”

As noted above, the MAA applies to all employees. As the Charging Party points out, some disputes covered by the MAA with some of these employees would likely affect commerce, and other minor disputes likely would not. Take the example of a security worker who walks a block to work (not across state lines) at the same Hobby Lobby store each day. It is hard to see how an individual arbitration, required by the MAA, about a disagreement over the timing of this security worker’s lunch break evidences any transaction involving commerce. The fact that the employer is engaged in interstate commerce does not, in my view, render any individual agreement to arbitrate an employment dispute as a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” because it is not the employer’s business of producing and selling goods in interstate commerce comprising the “transaction” evidenced by the MAA. To interpret the FAA this broadly would finally stretch it to its breaking point.¹⁸

regard to the jurisdiction in which any action or special proceeding may be instituted.” 218 F.2d 948, 949–950 (2d Cir. 1955).

¹³ I have not been asked to decide whether the entire employee handbook is a contract, and make no findings on this point.

There is no evidence here of any contract setting forth payment, duties, etc. of the various employees’ jobs, as in *Bernhardt*. This renders the interpretation in this decision narrower than in *Bernhardt* because I am not looking at a broader employment contract, with an agreement to arbitrate disputes embedded in it, and whether that contract has been breached based on the terms of that contract. Instead, I am looking at whether any employment dispute covered by the contract, here the MAA, evidences a transaction involving commerce.

¹⁴ It strikes me as peculiar that the contract to arbitrate itself is the contract at issue to determine applicability of the FAA, rather than an external contract or agreement subject to an arbitration provision. In most cases, the arbitration agreement would kick in if there was a dispute as to performance under the terms of the agreement. Here, a dispute regarding performance under the terms of the MAA would concern whether the employee submitted a covered dispute to arbitration in line with the MAA, or breached the agreement by filing a lawsuit in court.

¹⁵ Oddly, by this language the MAA is in part made in consideration for itself.

¹⁶ Moreover, as the Respondent asserts, employees who have filed class and/or collective lawsuits have not been disciplined, much less been terminated.

¹⁷ Of course, there would be a clause stating that any disputes over this policy would be subject to arbitration.

¹⁸ Many of the Supreme Court Justices, for example, believe the FAA was stretched too far when the Court determined it applied to state court claims. *Southland Corp. v. Keating*, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissenting; See also *Allied-Bruce Terminix*, supra., Justice O’Connor concurring; Justice Scalia dissenting; Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissenting. Others

Even if the “transaction” the MAA contemplates is employment or continued employment under the MAA’s terms, the individual agreements do not necessarily “evidence a transaction involving commerce.” As in *Bernhardt*, not all of the Respondent’s employees, while performing their duties, are “‘in’ commerce, . . . producing goods for commerce, or . . . engaging in activity that affect[s] commerce”

Consideration of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.*, 539 U.S. 52 (2003), does not lead to a different finding. In *Citizen’s Bank*, the Court stated, “Congress’ Commerce Clause power ‘may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce’ if in the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent ‘a general practice . . . subject to federal control.’” 539 U.S. at 56–57, quoting *Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.*, 334 U.S. 219, 236, (1948). *Citizens Bank* and *Alafabco*, a fabrication and construction company, entered into debt-restructuring agreements that contained an agreement to arbitrate any disputes. The Court rejected the argument that the individual transactions underlying the agreements did not, taken alone, have a “substantial effect on interstate commerce.” *Id.* at 56. First, the Court found that *Alafabco* engaged in interstate commerce using loans from *Citizens Bank* that were renegotiated and redocumented in the debt-restructuring agreements. Second, the loans at issue were secured by goods assembled out-of-state. Finally, the Court relied upon the “broad impact of commercial lending on the national economy [and] Congress’ power to regulate that activity pursuant to the Commerce Clause.” The arbitration agreements between the Respondent and the individual employees in this case do not fall within any of these rationales.

The Charging Party, pointing out that the FAA derives its authority from the Commerce Clause, cites to *National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius*, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). *Sebelius* discusses the Commerce Clause in relation to Affordable Healthcare Act’s (ACA) provision requiring individuals to buy health insurance, commonly known as the individual mandate. In describing the reach of the Commerce Clause in *Sebelius*, the Court observed, “Our precedent also reflects this understanding. As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching ‘activity.’” The Court determined that the “activity” at issue with regard to the individual mandate was the purchase of healthcare insurance, and that under the Commerce Clause, Congress was not empowered to regulate the failure to engage in this activity. Under this analysis, the “activity” the MAA concerns is resolution of employment disputes. For the reasons described above, this “activity” does not necessarily affect interstate commerce, particularly in cases where no dispute with regard to employment under the MAA ever arises.

Based on the foregoing, I agree with the Charging Party that the Respondent has made no showing that an arbitration agree-

ment between the Respondent and any of its individual employees affects commerce.¹⁹

4. Team truckdrivers

The Charging Party further argues that team truck drivers who transport the Respondent’s products across state lines are a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore fall within FAA’s exception at 9 U.S.C. § 1. The Court in *Circuit City* held that “Section 1 exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers.” The interstate truck drivers are clearly transportation workers, a fact not disputed by the Respondent, and therefore are exempt from the FAA. Requiring the team truck drivers to sign and adhere to the MAA therefore violates the Act, regardless of the Board’s decisions in *D. R. Horton* and related cases.

B. Enforcement of the MAA

Complaint paragraphs 4(e) and 5 allege that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by enforcing the MAA, as detailed above.

It is well settled that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by enforcing a rule that unlawfully restricts Section 7 rights. See, e.g., *NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.*, 370 U.S. 9, 16–17 (1962); *Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB*, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).

Here, it is undisputed that the Respondent enforced the MAA by filing motions to compel individual arbitration in *Fardig* and *Ortiz*, as detailed above. (Jt. Exhs. Y, Z). The Respondent contends that the Board lacks authority to enjoin the Respondent’s motions to compel because they are protected by the First Amendment under *Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB*, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983), and *BE&K Construction CO. v. NLRB*, 536 U.S. 516 (2002). I find that instant case falls within the exception set forth in *Bill Johnson’s* at footnote 5, which states in relevant part:

It should be kept in mind that what is involved here is an employer’s lawsuit that the federal law would not bar except for its allegedly retaliatory motivation. We are not dealing with a suit that is claimed to be beyond the jurisdiction of the state courts because of federal-law preemption, or a suit that has an objective that is illegal under federal law. Petitioner concedes that the Board may enjoin these latter types of suits. . . . Nor could it be successfully argued otherwise, for we have upheld Board orders enjoining unions from prosecuting court suits for enforcement of fines that could not lawfully be imposed under the Act, see *Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union*, 187 N.L.R.B. 636, 637 (1970), enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 369 (CA1 1971), rev’d, 409 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 385, 34 L.Ed.2d 422 (1972); *Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists & Aerospace Workers*, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 383 (1970), enforced

¹⁹ As the party asserting the FAA as an affirmative defense, the Respondent has the burden of proof to show that the agreements at issue are subject to the FAA. The assertion of the FAA as an affirmative defense requires me to address its reach in this decision. Though, as the Respondent notes, many courts have disagreed with the Board’s rationale in *D. R. Horton*, et. al., the precise issue of whether a particular agreement to arbitrate is a “maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” has not been squarely addressed.

believe it was stretched too far when it was held to apply to employment contracts. *Circuit City*, supra, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, dissenting; Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, dissenting.

in relevant part, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 459 F.2d 1143 (1972), *aff'd*, 412 U.S. 84, 93 S.Ct. 1961, 36 L.Ed.2d 764 (1973), and this Court has concluded that, at the Board's request, a District Court may enjoin enforcement of a state-court injunction "where [the Board's] federal power preempts the field." *NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.*, 404 U.S. 138, 144, 92 S.Ct. 373, 377, 30 L.Ed.2d 328 (1971).

The Board has determined that these exceptions apply in the wake of *Bill Johnson's* and *BE&K Construction*. See, e.g., *Allied Trades Council (Duane Reade Inc.)*, 342 NLRB 1010, 1013, fn. 4 (2004); *Teamsters, Local 776 (Rite Aid)*, 305 NLRB 832, 835 (1991). Moreover, particular litigation tactics may fall within the exception even if the entire lawsuit may not be enjoined. *Wright Electric, Inc.*, 327 NLRB 1194, 1195 (1999), *enfd.* 200 F.3d 1162 (8th Cir. 2000); *Dilling Mechanical Contractors*, 357 NLRB 544 (2011). As such, since the Board has concluded that agreements such as those comprising the MAA explicitly restrict Section 7 activity, the Respondent's attempt to enforce the MAA in state court by moving to compel arbitration fall within the unlawful objective exception in *Bill Johnson's*. See *Neiman Marcus Group*, *supra*.

The Respondent argues that numerous courts have found agreements such as the MAA to be lawful and enforceable. While this is true, the Board has held that agreements such as the MAA violate the Act, and the Supreme Court has not ruled otherwise. The Respondent, by its actions in court, is challenging Board case law which very clearly holds the MAA violates the Act. The motion to compel arbitration, which by virtue of the MAA can only be on an individual basis, is the crux of the challenge. Inherent in this challenge are risks, which the Respondent is assuming by declining to follow the Board's case law as it works its way through the system.

C. The MAA and Board Charges

Complaint paragraphs 4(b) and 5 allege that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining, at all material times since at least April 28, 2014, which would reasonably be read by employees to prohibit them from filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board.

The *Lutheran Heritage* test set forth above applies to this allegation. I find that employees would reasonably construe the MAA as restricting their access to file charges with the Board.

The MAA is worded very broadly, and explicitly states it applies to "any dispute, demand, claim, controversy, cause of action, or suit (collectively referred to as "Dispute") that Employee may have" at any time that that "in any way arises out of, involves, or relates to Employee's employment" with the Respondent. This would certainly encompass an unfair labor practice charge with the Board.

More specifically, the MAA includes disputes involving:

wrongful termination, wages, compensation, work hours, . . . sexual harassment, harassment and/or discrimination based on any class protected by federal, state or municipal law, and all Disputes involving interference and/or retaliation relating to workers' compensation, family or medical leave, health and safety, harassment, discrimination, and/or the opposition of

harassment or discrimination, and/or any other employment-related Dispute.

Certainly, disputes about wrongful termination, wages, compensation, and hours could comprise unfair labor practice claims. Discrimination based on Section 7 activity also is encompassed by this language.

The MAA then proceeds to state it applies to disputes under various federal laws, ending with a catchall that it applies to disputes under :

all other federal, state, and municipal statutes, regulations, codes, ordinances, common laws, or public policies that regulate, govern, cover, or relate to equal employment, wrongful termination, wages, compensation, work hours, invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, defamation, negligence, personal injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium, breach of fiduciary duty, sexual harassment, harassment and/or discrimination based on any class protected by federal, state or municipal law, or interference and/or retaliation involving workers' compensation, family or medical leave, health and safety, harassment, discrimination, or the opposition of harassment or discrimination, and any other employment-related Dispute in tort or contract.

That this would encompass some claims under the NLRA requires no explanation. The only claims explicitly excluded are benefits under unemployment compensation laws or workers' compensation laws.

The Respondent contends that the MAA would not be interpreted to apply to Board charges because of the following language:

By agreeing to arbitrate all Disputes, Employee and Company understand that they are not giving up any substantive rights under federal, state or municipal law (including the right to file claims with federal, state or municipal government agencies).

The Respondent contends that because of the explicit statement that claims with federal, state, or municipal agencies are excluded from the MAA, any misinterpretation of the MAA would be manifestly unreasonable. I disagree.

To begin with, the MAA specifically states claims of sexual harassment, harassment and/or discrimination based on any class protected by federal law are subject to mandatory individual arbitration. These are all patently clear examples of claims that arise under the civil rights statutes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces, i.e., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.²⁰ Yet the MAA also states that nothing would preclude an employee from filing a charge with a federal agency, ostensibly including the EEOC.²¹ The only way to reconcile these two provisions is to read the MAA as not precluding filing a charge with an ad-

²⁰ These statutes are respectively codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 121-1 et seq.; and 20 U.S.C. 633a.

²¹ The EEOC's charge-filing process is described at <http://eeoc.gov/employees/howtofile.cfm>.

ministrative agency, yet in the end those disputes must be resolved only through final and binding arbitration under the MAA rather than through whatever fruits filing a charge or other similar effort may bear. The same rationale holds true for Board proceedings, given that the MAA requires individual arbitration of disputes over “wrongful termination, wages, compensation, work hours.” This begs the question: Why would any employee bother to file a charge? A reasonable employee, not versed in how various federal, state, and local agencies process claims, would take it at face value that the topics specifically included as falling within the MAA would be subject to arbitration. This is particularly true given that the MAA explicitly excludes benefits under unemployment compensation laws or workers’ compensation laws, but not under the NLRA.

Considering that ambiguities must be construed against the drafter of the MAA, which is the Respondent, I find the MAA violates Section 8(a)(1) because employees would reasonably believe the MAA requires arbitration of employment-related claims covered by the Act. See *Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center*, 317 NLRB 218 (1995).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

(1) The Respondent, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

(2) The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement (MAA) requiring all employment-related disputes to be submitted to individual binding arbitration.

(3) The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it enforced the MAA by asserting the MAA in litigation the Charging Party brought against the Respondent.

(4) The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

REMEDY

Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.

As I have concluded that the MAA is unlawful, the recommended order requires that the Respondent revise or rescind it in all of its forms to make clear to employees that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of their right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict employees’ right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board. The Respondent shall notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement in any form that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised agreement. Because the Respondent utilized the MAA on a corporatewide basis, the Respondent shall post a notice at all locations where the MAA, or any portion of it requiring all employment-related disputes to be submitted to individual binding arbitration, was in effect.

See, e.g., *U-Haul Co. of California*, supra, fn. 2 (2006); *D. R. Horton*, supra, slip op. at 17; *Murphy Oil*, supra.

I recommend the Respondent be required to notify the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD (E.D. Cal.), and the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVSAN (C.D. Cal.), that it has rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration agreements upon which it based its motion to dismiss these actions and to compel individual arbitration of the claims, and inform the court that it no longer opposes the actions on the basis of the arbitration agreement.

I recommend the Company be required to reimburse employees for any litigation and related expenses, with interest, to date and in the future, directly related to the Company’s filing its motion to compel arbitrations in *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD (E.D. Cal.), and *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVSAN (C.D. Cal.). Determining the applicable rate of interest on the reimbursement will be as outlined in *New Horizons*, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), (adopting the Internal Revenue Service rate for underpayment of Federal taxes). Interest on all amounts due to the employees shall be computed on a daily basis as prescribed in *Kentucky River Medical Center*, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended²²

ORDER

The Respondent, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with a place of business in Sacramento, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from

(a) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts the right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

(b) Maintaining and/or enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement that requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear to employees that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of their right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict employees’ right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

(b) Notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement in any form

²² If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised agreement.

(c) Notify the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD (E.D. Cal.), and the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVSAN (C.D. Cal.), that it has rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration agreement upon which it based its motions to dismiss the class and collective actions and to compel individual arbitration of the employees' claim, and inform the respective courts that it no longer opposes the actions on the basis of the arbitration agreement.

(d) In the manner set forth in this decision, reimburse the plaintiffs who filed suit in *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD (E.D. Cal.), and *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVSAN (C.D. Cal.), for any reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses that she may have incurred in opposing the Respondent's motion to dismiss the wage claim and compel individual arbitration.

(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all facilities in California the attached notice marked "Appendix A," and at all other facilities employing covered employees, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."²³ Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 28, 2014.

(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. September 8, 2015

APPENDIX A

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

²³ If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

- Form, join, or assist a union
- Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
- Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
- Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agreement that our employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement that requires our employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights listed above.

WE WILL rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict your right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms that the arbitration agreement has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, we will provide them a copy of the revised agreement.

WE WILL notify the courts in which the employees filed their claims in *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD (E.D. Cal.), and *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVSAN (C.D. Cal.), that we have rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration agreement upon which we based our motion to dismiss her collective wage claim and compel individual arbitration, and we will inform the court that we no longer oppose the employees' claims on the basis of that agreement.

WE WILL reimburse the plaintiffs in *Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 2:13-cv-01619-TLN-DAD (E.D. Cal.), and *Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 8:14-cv-00561-JVSAN (C.D. Cal.), for any reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses that she may have incurred in opposing our motion to dismiss her collective wage claim and compel individual arbitration.

HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC.

The Administrative Law Judge's decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-139745 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.



APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

- Form, join, or assist a union
- Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
- Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
- Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agreement that our employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement that requires our employees, as a condition of

employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights listed above.

WE WILL rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict your right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement in all of its forms that the arbitration agreement has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, we will provide them a copy of the revised agreement.

HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC.

The Administrative Law Judge's decision can be found at www.nlr.gov/case/20-CA-139745 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.

